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MIXUPS IN THE WAREHOUSE CENTRALIZATION AND
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE MULTI-PLANT FIRM
Lynn Hunnicutt

ABSTRACT

Single-plant firms choose quantity/quality levels to maximize profits. Multi-plant
firms face this decision and must also choose how many decision makers to have. This
paper presents two case studies and a model of a multi-plant firm in which overhead
costs are lower with one decision-maker (centralization), but the mass of information and
the need for timely decisions make occasional mixups unavaoidable. Multiple decision
makers (decentralization) solves the mixup problem. Standardization-treating different
outlets similarly in response to costly mixups-appears in the case studies, and is
demonstrated as a result in the model.
JEL Classifications: D21, L23

MIXUPS IN THE WAREHOUSE CENTRALIZATION AND
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE MULTI-PLANT FIRM*
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Introduction

All firms receive information and use it to make decisions.

Multi-plant firms receIve

information at scattered locations and must choose how this knowledge will flow and how
decisions will be made.

The firm might have a single decision maker, which I call

centralization, or it might allow each location to make decisions based on any information
available to them, a situation I call decentralization.
This paper considers issues affecting the choice between one and several decision
makers, first through a simple model of a multi-plant firm and then through two case studies
which illustrate many of the model's conclusions. The model assumes, and the case studies
show that a single decision maker often has trouble handling all information available from
widely scattered locations. Mixups (shipping the wrong bundle to an outlet) are an unavoidable
consequence of having a single "boss."[ When the firm has more than one decision maker,
mixups are avoided, but overhead costs are larger. One of the model's key results, which is confirmed by the case studies, is that the centralized firm often "standardizes" as a way to simplify
the problem it faces. That is, it ships similar (and less-than-optimal) bundles to all outlets, even
though resizing or reforming bundles could increase the profitability of anyone outlet.
There is a large literature in which delay (and its minimization) is the driving force
behind organizational form. Radner (1993), Van Zandt and Radner (1995), Van Zandt (1995),
Van Zandt (1998) use organizational form to minimize the time required to process a batch of
information. This work is extended by Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), who include both processing and communication delay. The firm minimizes delay when agents specialize in processing particular types of information. Specialization also occurs in the model ofGeanakoplos
and Milgrom (1991), in which the firm may dictate which bits of information managers attend
to. The firm's problem then is to coordinate the different bits of information its managers hold.
Communication delay is at issue in Marschak and Reichelstein (1998), who relate organizational
structure to the size of communication costs and message complexity. The issue of time to
transmit information is also considered in Govindarajan (1986), who note that communication
delay in a rapidly changing environment or in a firm where coordination is crucial may
favor centralization. A key assumption of these models is that no worker below the top

*Thanks are due to my dissertation supervisor, R. Preston McAfee, and to Maxwell Stinchcombe and David Scoones
for their helpful suggestions and continuously open office doors. This paper has also benefitted from comments received at the
1996 Lonestars Conference, and at seminars given at The University of Texas at Austin, Southern Methodist University and Texas
A&M University . Any remaining errors are mine.
.
I Centralization will be used interchangeably with "single decision maker" throughout this paper. Decentralization tells
us that every plant is empowered to make decisions for itself.
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of the hierarchy is empowered to act without direction from above.
A second function of organizational form is to prevent the firm from undertaking substandard projects. Sah and Stiglitz (1986), and Sah and Stiglitz (1991) show
that when overall project quality is low, hierarchy is preferred as it is more likely to
reject projects. Because it is more likely to accept projects, polyarchy is more profitable
when individual managers hold potential projects to high standards. This work was
extended by Koh (1992), who showed that the firm minimizes its costs if managers
undertaking the first review of a project reject it when they work in a hierarchy and
accept it when they work in a polyarchy. Thus, managers working in a hierarchy should
have a higher standard for acceptance than those working in a polyarchy. Managerial
ability may also affect the choice of organizational form, since a single manager's influence is larger in a centralized organization than under decentralization (Sah (1991)).
When the manager is not able, centralization may lead to markedly lower profits than
a decentralized firm would achieve.
Discovery and implementation of optimal policies may also be affected by the
organization's structure. A single location may search for the optimal policy to be
implemented everywhere (centralization), or all units may search, and mayor may
not adopt policies selected by others (decentralization). Better policies are discovered
when the organization employs multiple searchers, and/or when the single searcher
becomes more sophisticated. Kollman, Miller, and Page (1999) demonstrate that for
moderately difficult problems, multiple searchers (decentralization) improves the organizational outcome more than a more sophisticated headquarters, but very easy or very
difficult problems are better solved by improving headquarters' sophistication. As in
Aoki (1986), decentralization is preferred for problems of moderate difficulty because
response time is faster and miscoordination is unlikely; centralization is preferred when
(1) local conditions change little (centralization is less expensive) or (2) local conditions
are extremely variable (decentralized units may settle on sub-optimal policies).
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Organizational form also affects the firm's rate of innovation through knowledge
spillovers between outlets. Chang and Harrington, Jr. (1998),and Chang and Harrington Jr. (1999) show that a firm should centralize when knowledge spillovers between
outlets outweigh the benefits of procedures tailored to each local market. When innovation opportunities are rich , the firm should free outlets to search for innovations on
their own (i.e. decentralize) , but if innovations are complex, the firm is more profitable
when headquarters searches for innovations to be implemented by all outlets.
In contrast to the papers in which delay drives the choice of organizational
form , and the papers in which undertaking quality projects is the firm's objective, this
paper allows for both centralized and decentralized decision making. The first group
of papers does not consider decentralized decisions, while the second does not allow
for centralized decisions. Additionally, standardization is a result in this model, not an
assumption as in the optimal policy and rate of innovation literatures. 2 In the model
presented below, the centralized firm does not require all outlets to be identical. I
show that as a result of errors, it is optimal for headquarters to treat outlets similarly,
although not identically.
This paper considers the effect of mixups on total production. I show that
the "error free" centralized firm produces more and enjoys higher profits than the
decentralized firm. Because the cost of errors depends in part on differences in markets ,
the more similar the markets in which the firm operates, the more likely it is that the
firm is centralized. I also show that as mistakes become less likely, the centralized firm
becomes more profitable. This suggests that improvements in inventory tracking and
handling technology should lead firms to centralize decision making. 3
2In fact , the model presented below shows that complete standardization (treating all outlets
equally), as happens in both the optimal policy and rate of innovation papers listed above, is never an
optimal strategy.
3In a related paper , Baiman Larcker , and Rajan (1995) present a model in which centralization is
a function of the costliness of potential errors made by business units . They show that as errors are
more costly the firm 's headquarters delegates fewer tasks to the unit , so that the firm becomes more
centralized as the costliness of errors rises. Here , headquarters makes the errors, so that more likely
.
(costly) mistakes favor decentralization.
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A model of a firm choosing whether to have a single decision maker or to
decent ralize decision making is presented in section 2. Following that , two case studies
are discussed and I show how the predictions of the model parallel developments within
each firm. Conclusions and suggestions for further research appear in the final section.

2

The Model

The model describes a firm in which production/warehousing decisions can be made at
a single location for the entire firm , with bundles packed and shipped to various outlets
(centr alized ), or they can be made by each outlet for itself (decentralized). Intermediate
forms in which decision making is split among several levels are not considered. 4 I will
model the firm as a team, rather than a collection of self-interested players. This allows
me to abstract from strategic behavior by outlets. 5
The firm is assumed to have some activity which I will call "sales" that cannot
be centralized. If production decisions are made at a single location for the entire
firm , information overload causes the decision maker to occasionally ship a location's
optimal bundle incorrectly.6 These mixups do not occur when each outlet makes its
own production decisions, so that a decentralized finn does not make mistakes. On
the other h and , the centralized firm obtains economies of scale not available to the
decentralized firm. This tradeoff between lower overhead costs and inevitable mixups
with centralization motivates the firm's choice to have one or many decision makers.
The firm has n outlets, each of which earns revenue

~(q)

(an increasing and

strictly concave function). We may think of q as quantity of a single good , in which
4The problem that arises is in defining "centralization." If a two-layer hierarchy is possible, we
may see a centralized group of centralized regions (complete centralization) , a decentralized group of
centralized regions (regional centralization), or a decentralized group of de'c entralized regions (complete
decentralization). The analysis of such a system involves extensive algebra, but generates no additional
insights. It can be shown that regional centralization mirrors general centralization.
5Strategic behavior within teams has been extensively studied. I ignore it in order to highlight other
issues pertinent to the centralization-decentralization choice.
6Every outlet receives some bundle in the model.
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case outlets are assumed to be operating in different sized markets. The model 's main
results continue to hold if q is taken to represent other characteristics such as color
mix, size, or special features. The key assumption is that for each location there is
some optimal bundle based on characteristics of its revenue function. Total revenue
for the firm is given by

I:i ~(qi) '

where qi may vary across outlets. When the firm

is centralized, outlet i receives some bundle qj that is optimal for one of the firm's n
locations. When i = j, the central warehouse has shipped correctly; when i =I- j, the
central warehouse had made a mistake, which occurs with probability

E. 7

In order to generate economies of scale, I assume increasing concave costs,

which implies that the cost of producing at each location separately exceeds the cost
of producing the same quantity at a single location;

I:i C(qi) > c(2:i qi).

Concave

cost may represent actual increasing returns to scale, or the elimination of duplicated
services that centralized warehousing/production makes possible.
The centralized firm's profits are given by:

(1)

Where R(qic) = ~

2: j Rj(qic)

and Q =

2:i qic'

When a bundle is misshipped (probabil-

ity E), I assume that it is sent to any of the outlets with equal probability.8
Because the firm's cost function is concave its profit function might be convex,
so that a finite profit maximizing set of bundles may not exist. In order to guarantee
existence of a finite solution the revenue function must be more concave than the cost
function. Standard second-order conditions for profit maximization (which are assumed
to hold here) support this conclusion.
7It is important to emphasize that every outlet receives an "optimal" bundle. In the decentralized
firm , each outlet receives its own optimal bundle for sure. In the centralized firm, each outlet receives
its own optimal bundle with probability 1 - c.
8Note that shipping the correct quantity is included as a potential error. While it is possible to
avoid this by considering the probability that a bundle is misshipped as c/(n - 1), the notation is
greatly complicated for no benefit. Using this alternative notation, an error occurs with probability
(n - l)c/n.
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The decentralized firm's profit function is

(2)

The firm no longer obtains economies of scale, but mixups are never made.

that even when centralized firm ships the same bundle to every outlet, it earns more
profit than the decentralized firm. Proposition 2 below shows that completely random
shipping (c = 1) causes the centralized firm to send the same bundle to all outlets.
Thus , if the inequality listed above holds, the centralized firm that makes only errors
will be more profitable than the decentralized firm , so that the firm will always choose
to centralize. The more interesting case occurs when this inequality is reversed, which
will be assumed. In effect, by assuming that decentralization is preferred to "random"
centralization, I am assuming that the benefit to accuracy in assignment eventually
outweighs available economies of scale.
In selecting bundles for each outlet, the firm has the option to ship the same

bundle to all outlets, regardless of their differences. When this occurs, I say that the
firm is completely standardized . Under complete standardization, the warehouse ships
the bundle qs to every outlet , regardless of the signal it receives. In that case , profits
are given by
(3)
Notice that qs does not depend on c, since the bundle sent to outlet i is the same whether
the firm is shipping correctly (probability 1 - c), or making a mistake (probability c).9
Also, as long as outlets have different revenue functions , qi =1= qs for all i. Although the
completely standardized firm would profit from reassignment of goods between outlets,
the problem of misassignment is eliminated. Finally, qs will generally not be the average
9If we use a different mistake structure , this conclusion may not hold. For example, if outlet i
sometimes receives nothing, the standardized bundle may be affected by E:.
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quantity

( ~qi/n) ,

since the profit function is concave.

To review , our firm operates in n markets , and chooses to have either a single decision maker (centralization) , or to allow each outlet to make its own decisions
(decentralization). One option for the centralized firm is to ship the same bundle to

all outlets, regardless of differences between them. I call this complete standardization. Not surprisingly, complete standardization is never an optimal strategy, although
partial standardization (shipping similar but not identical bundles) turns out to be an

optimal response to increasingly likely mixups.
The first result compares total quantity and profits for the error-free centralized
firm to total quantity and profits for the decentralized firm. Errors can be eliminated
in two ways , by perfect shipping or when all outlets are the same (since then a single
bundle is optimal for everyone) .
Proposition 1 When all outlets are the same

(~(q) =

Rj(q) V i,j), or when errors

never occur (c = 0) the centralized firm produces more for each outlet (q7c 2: q7d Vi)
and enjoys larger profits than the decentralized firm (TIc 2: IId).

For a proof of Proposition 1 and all subsequent results, see the appendix. The
first premise suggests that since similarity between outlets makes centralization preferable, firms with outlets in identical markets are more likely to be centralized than those
with outlets in widely disparate locations. The second premise (c = 0) suggests that
finns with smaller numbers of misshipments are more likely to be centralized. That is,
as communication and warehousing technology improvements reduce the likelihood of
misshipment, we expect to see firms investing in this improved technology and centralizing their warehousing.
Centralized profits are larger than decentralized when the centralized firm does
not make mistakes. By assumption, centralized profits fall to below the decentralized
level when the centralized firm makes only mistakes. Continuity of the profit function
allows us to appeal to the intermediate value theorem and conclude that there is some
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likelihood of mixups (c) for which the firm is indifferent between centralization and
decentralization.
How does total centralized quantity change with c? Proposition 1 tells us that
when c = 0, the centralized firm produces more than the decentralized firm. If we can
show that total centralized quantity rises as mistakes become more likely, we can prove
that the centralized firm always produces nl0re. Unfortunately, ~ cannot be signed in
general ,

10

although if we assume that the revenue function is given by ~(q)

= AiR(q)

and require ;:,~~) to be increasing in q,l1 we can show that the centralized firm produces
more as mistakes become more likely (~ 2 0). See the appendix for details. Since
the centralized firm produces more than the decentralized firm when mistakes never
occur (result 1) , we can conclude that in this special case the firm is larger under
centralization (i.e. always produces more). One can think of Ai as an indicator of
intensity of demand, so that larger Ai implies both higher total and marginal demand.
Another interpretation of Ai is as an indicator of market size. In this case, R( q) gives
the revenue per custOlner, and each market has Ai customers. Larger markets receive
larger quantities.
We have yet to see when and if the centralized firm will wish to standardize.
Theorem 4 shows that the centralized firm will never completely standardize, as profits
improve when the firm exploits information from the outlets, even though doing so
occasionally leads to mistakes . We first provide two intermediate results , used to prove
theorem 4.
Proposition 2 When the centralized firm always makes mistakes, its profit equals that
of the standardized firm. That is, lIe 1€=1 = lIs.

Mathematically, proposition 2 is a risk aversion result. With variable bundle
lOSimple calculation shows that

~ agrees in sign with

I:

Ri (/~ic) -R'

(qip,)
,
( l-c)Ri (qic HcR (q ic )

which cannot be

definitively signed.
llThis is true when R,,2 > R'RIII, which is guaranteed if R'" is negative, or small relative to R".
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size, as errors become more common t he likelihood of receiving a completely inappropriate bundle rises. This is costly to the firm , and causes it to make all of the
bundles slightly inappropriate, rather than suffer the lost revenues from completely
inappropriate bundles. The intuition behind this result is as follows: if qi and qj are
different-sized bundles , each of which goes to outlet k with equal likelihood, and qi
earns the firm more revenue than qj when shipments are random, then the firm will be
more profitable shipping two bundles qi (that is completely standardizing).
Thus , when the centralized firm cannot eliminate mistakes, it ships quantity qs
to every outlet. Notice that this quantity may not be the arithmetical average of optimal
quantities J 2 Depending on the curvature of the revenue function , the standardized
quantity may be greater or less than the average of optimal quantities. The firm may
find it profitable to ship slightly more than average in order to provide close to adequate
supplies for large markets , or it may ship slightly less than average in order to avoid
storage costs in small markets.
To compare standardized and centralized profits when

E

is less than one, we

must first show that as the likelihood of error rises , profits of the centralized firm fall.
Lemma 3 Centralized profits fall as the probability of misshipment rises.
QIk
dE <
-

That

'l,S,

0.
Cent ralized profits strictly decrease as mistakes become more likely when the

firm has at least one outlet different from the others. In that case, we can replace the
weak inequality of lemma 3 with a strict one.
We are now ready to compare the centralized and standardized firms.

As

noted above, if the centralized firm ever correctly uses information it receives from the
outlets, it is better off to account for that information, even though doing so increases
t he costliness of making a mistake.
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Theorem 4 When the centralized firm ships correctly with any positive probability, its

profits are higher than those of the standardized firm. That is, ITc 1£<12 ITs.

As with lemma 3, if at least one of the outlets is different from the others, we
may replace the weak inequality of theorem 4 with a strict one.
Thus far, we have compared the various profit functions , and the effect on
total quantity as the likelihood of misshipment (c) varied. What is the effect of more
probable misshipments on any single outlet's quantity? Does a rise in the likelihood of
error cause a given outlet's optimal bundle to rise or fall?
The change in anyone outlet's optimal bundle (q;c) caused by a rise in the
likelihood of error (c) can be broken down into two parts; that due to the redistribution
of a given total quantity, and that due to a change in the total quantity produced.

The first part (known as the redistribution effect) can be explained by noting that as
mistakes become more likely, the centralized firm ships large outlets' bundles to small
outlets (and vice versa) more often. This suggests that it would be profitable to ship
slightly larger bundles to the small outlets, and slightly smaller bundles to the large
outlets as c rises (partial standardization).
The second part of the change in an individual outlet's bundle (the total quantity effect) comes indirectly through the change in total quantity caused by more frequent mix ups (~). A larger (or smaller) total quantity affects the firm's cost structure

(c( Q) and c' (Q)), which in turn influences the bundle shipped to anyone outlet. Since
costs are concave, marginal cost for each outlet falls as the firm's total output rises.
This suggests that all outlets (big and small) should receive larger bundles as mixups
become more COlllmon.
Theorem 5 formalizes the intuition of the redistribution effect, showing that
for a given total quantity, as mixups become more likely the firm will reallocate this
amount between outlets, so that small outlets receive slightly more and large outlets
receive slightly less. More frequent mistakes lead to partial standardization. While the
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centralized firm should exploit any possibility of shipping correctly, it will look more
like a standardized firm as its ability to do so falls.
Notice that the standardization of the centralized firm is a result , not an assumption. Although standardization is never "optimal" , in that the centralized firm
would like to differentiate between outlets , the centralized firm begins to standardize
in response to increasing likelihood of shipping incorrectly.
Theorem 5 If the firm is facing a distribution issue only, there is a quantity q such that

optimal centralized quantity rises with c for outlets receiving less than
for outlets receiving more than q. That is, when ~
such that ~ > «)0 {:} qic

q and falls

with c

= 0, there exists q E [qic,min' qic,max]

< (> )q.

It would be nice to have a stronger version of theorem 5, namely that standard-

ization arises endogenously even when total quantity is allowed to vary with c. The
conflict between the total quantity effect and the redistribution effect make this result
unobtainable , even in the special case considered above

(~(q)

= AiR(q)).

If the firm

has several small outlets whose optimal quantities rise as the probability of error rises,
the firm's total quantity may also rise. But this lowers marginal cost , so that even the
largest outlets may receive more as c rises. Similarly, when the firm's total quantity

(Qc) falls as mixups become more probable, the firm's marginal cost is higher, so that
even small outlets may receive less as crises.
Although the model takes q to represent quantity of a single good, its results
continue to hold if we reinterpret q to represent the number of different products carried
by each outlet. According to this reasoning, a firm is standardized when each of its
outlets sells the same mix of products. A non-standardized firm would allow for at least
some local variation, so that the outlet in Seattle carried umbrellas along with other
goods , while the Paln1 Springs outlet carried suntan lotion in its mix of products. Under
this interpretation, "producing more" involves carrying a wider array of products.
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In the next section, I present two case studies which suggest that this model
accurately describes a firm choosing between one and many decision makers. For both
firms , mixups occurred under centralization, although economies of scale were achieved.
Benetton has been able to centralize both ordering and production since advanced
warehouse technology has minimized mixups (lemma 3). Both firms have standardized
(Benetton in its product offering and production technique, and' Sears in the way its
stores are set up) partly in response to errors caused by centralization (theorem 5).

3
3.1

Case Studies
Benetton

The Italian clothing company Benetton illustrates the model's result that the centralized firm finds it profitable to partially standardize. Benetton has centralized sales and
ordering information from all of its stores worldwide, which has led it to standardize
product lines and production techniques.
As a retailer, Benetton has over 4,000 outlets throughout the world, which
must be geographically dispersed so that Benetton can be close to its customers. For
the activities in which it has a choice (ordering and production) , Benetton has chosen
a highly centralized form. All of its outlets are linked via computer to company headquarters in Ponzano , Italy13 , where sales data from each outlet can be used to create
large production orders for factories. This means that outlets have very little freedom in
selecting the source or style of merchandise they carry. On the other hand , Benetton's
production, ordering and shipping costs are much lower, since larger batches imply
economies of scale as orders from a given region are grouped together, made together
and shipped together.
Centralizing sales information creates a very large information glut, however,
13Benetton's electronic data interchange network was recognized as quite advanced when it was
instituted in the late 1980s (Martin (July 1, 1989)).
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and requires Benetton headquarters to handle large amounts of data. Not only does
Benetton have to follow sales at over 4,000 outlets, it also has to keep track of several
different styles for each outlet. This is expensive, and makes it more likely that the firm
will make mistakes in ordering and shipping. While warehouse technology has reduced
this likelihood of error, misshipments are still of concern to Benetton managers. To
reduce the costliness of potential errors, Benetton has chosen to reduce the number of
styles it sells (i.e. standardize its product line).14 Fewer styles lowers the information
burden on the centralized ordering/sales computer, so that errors are less frequent and
less costly. Standardization also means outlets can sell the "mistakes" they receive,
since orders cannot be too different when only a few styles exist.
In addition to reducing information processing time and expense, and cutting
the costliness of errors, standardizing the product line allows Benetton to have large
production runs. If each outlet were allowed to offer its own styles of clothing, Benetton
would be forced to order (and/or produce) items in much smaller batches. By requiring
that all outlets carry the same basic styles, and by reducing the number of styles it
offers, Benetton is able to achieve economies of scale in production.
The Benetton case is the clearest example of a centralized firm choosing to
standardize its product line due to "information overload" mistakes. Standardization
has enabled Benetton to maintain centralized production and decision making, even
as sales are decentralized. The firm obtains economies of scale while minimizing the
costliness of errors. This centralization-standardization combination, predicted by the
model, has enabled Benetton to maintain profitability in a highly competitive industry.
14In the model , q may be interpreted as the size of single-good bundles shipped to outlets . Alternatively, we may take q to represent the number of different products an outlet carries, without losing
any of the model 's results. It is this second interpretation that applies to the Benetton case.
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3.2

Sears

Sears Roebuck & Co. (Sears) has been through several centralizations and decentralizations since Richard Sears founded the company in 1886. 15 During its early years,
Sears could be completely centralized because it had only one warehouse and no retail outlets. This changed in 1906, when Sears opened a warehouse in Dallas, Texas.
Decisions were still made at the Chicago headquarters, however.
Julius Rosenwald , who joined Sears in 1895 and ran the company from 1908
until his death in 1932, led the push to consolidate all operations into a single building.
He was a believer in centralization, and opposed every plan to decentralize operations,
including the plan to build the Dallas warehouse. 16
In 1925, Sears opened its first retail outlet. The undertaking was so successful
that by 1930, Sears operated 324 retail outlets. This growth continued through the
1950s, and included foreign markets (a Cuban outlet was opened in 1942, and a Mexican
outlet opened in 1947). During the early part of this expansion, Sears remained a highly
centralized organization, with all decisions made at company headquarters in Chicago.
Even in the early years of its retail expansion, Sears found it had trouble
handling its empire as a centralized organization. For example, warm winter coats were
occasionally shipped to the Miami outlet. Decentralization eliminated these mixups,
since managers in Miami knew better than to order winter coats.
Under its next chairman (Robert E. Wood) , Sears decentralized its operations. Shortly after Wood became company president in 1928, Sears separated into five
regional territories, each of which had almost complete autonomy in merchandising decisions. Only buying remained centralized, but in practice even this was done for each
region separately. While the firm lost economies of scale available under centralization,
15 For a short history of Sears, Roebuck and Co. see Hast (1994) . Sears recent history is documented
in Katz (1987).
16 Rosenwald saw this move as a concession to Texas chauvinism, and did not believe the company
needed additional facilities to serve the south .
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mixups were avoided since each regional manager could order the correct product for
his stores. The de facto result was five separate but related companies, each of which
acted independently of the others.
There are problems with decentralization, as Sears discovered. In the recession
of the early 1970s, Sears found itself a bloated federation of feuding regions. Duplication
of services meant greatly increased costs. Along with the energy wasted on intramural
competition, this led to falling profits and fiat earnings throughout the 1970s. 17 In 1978,
Edward Telling took the helm, and proceeded to centralize all buying and merchandising
operations. Coordination between regions was now handled by headquarters.
During this recentralization, Sears began to standardize its retail outlets based
on its concept of "The Store of the Future" (Katz (1987)). This store was designed to
both attract customers and streamline sales procedures. In effect, Sears gave up trying
to fit diverse local conditions in order to create an image that was widely recognized.18
While this new layout increased earnings slightly, they remained fiat through most of
the 1980s. Errors in centralization (snow blowers in Puerto Rico) remained a problem
for Sears throughout this period.
In 1995 Arthur Martinez took over at Sears. Mr. Martinez has begun to de-

centralize Sears' buying and merchandising functions. Stores in a few locations are now
allowed to select merchandise to fit local needs. The goal is to reduce the cost of mixups
in shipping , and increase incentives (much as it was during the first decentralization).
It is too soon to tell if this move away from centralization will be successful, although

Sears is apparently moving in the opposite direction from many of its competitors.1 9
As we saw in the model presented earlier, as improvements in warehouse technology
17(Hast (1994)) "[by the mid 1970s] Robert Wood's vaunted corporate democracy had turned into
an ungainly feudal state. The buyers, given complete freedom, operated an internal economy of their
own. Terrible inefficiencies and intramural rivalries resulted."
18This points to another reason for standardization - the creation of a well known image. Fast food
chains are standardized for this reason - customers are more likely to come to a store whose quality is
known than a place in which quality cannot be easily assessed.
19 "By decentralizing ... Sears is rowing against the retailing tide. To cut costs, more big retailers
centralize buying, or are moving in that direction, than do not." (Dobrzynski (January 7, 1996))
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make errors less likely (i.e., as c shrinks), we expect to see firms centralizing. Sears is
doing the opposite.
This case is a good illustration of the assumptions of the model presented earlier. The centralized firm is able to avoid unnecessary duplication and reduce overhead
costs by sharing activities and equipment. On the other hand, it is not able to meet local conditions without occasional errors (winter coats in Miami, snowblowers in Puerto
Rico) . In order to reduce the costliness of these mixups, Sears has utilized both standardization and decentralization. As in the Benetton case, the model's q represents the
number of products carried at an outlet.

4

Conclusions

The model presented in this paper considers a multi-plant firm choosing between having
one or having many decision makers. The firm obtains economies of scale when it is
centralized (one "boss") , but makes mistakes with positive probability. I have shown
that when the firm does not make mistakes , it should choose to be centralized. I have
assumed that when the firm makes only mistakes, it should decentralize. These two
facts imply that there is some level of error which makes the firm indifferent between
having one boss and having many.
When the firm is allocating a given total quantity, it will minimize the costliness
of its mistakes by partially standardizing the amount received at each outlet. While
complete standardization is never strictly preferred to differentiating between outlets,
when the centralized firm ships randomly, it can do no better than if it is completely
standardized. Additionally I have shown that it is optimal for the centralized firm to
partially standardize as the likelihood of error rises. In this model, standardization is
a result not an assumption.
This model may be used to describe several cases, two of which are included
here.

Perhaps the best of these is Benetton, which has maintained centralized or-
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dering , warehousing and production while standardizing its product line. It is also
a good description of Sears , which has centralized, decentralized, recentralized and
re-decentralized decision making regarding product lines and sales techniques.
Extensions to this model include allowing for the possibility that firms may
make investments to reduce the probability of error. If this investment is costly, the
firm's optimization problem then involves both selecting c and choosing an optimal
form. Such a generalization would be useful to describe the possibility that firms may
invest in computers and equipment to improve communication between centralized
facilities and scattered outlets.
A second extension would involve recharacterizing the cost of errors. Suppose
that in addition to lower than optimal revenue from a misshipment , the firm was also
required to pay a restocking cost. In this case, we expect the standardization result
to be even stronger, since costly restocking increases the benefit to making outlets
more similar , while the indirect effect through the change in production cost caused
by rising/falling total quantity is not affected by this addition to the model. On the
other hand, we are likely to lose the result proved above that the centralized firm is
always at least as profitable as the standardized firm. Instead, when restocking costs
are included, there may be error probabilities (c) for which the standardized firm is
more profitable than the centralized (and responsive) firm.
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A

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1:

Case 1: If all outlets are the same, both the centralized and decentralized firms are
standardized. That is, qic = qjc =

q~

and qid = qjd = q'd. Thus, we can write the firm's

profit function under each of the three regimes as:

IIc = nR(q~) - c(nq~)

IId

= n[R(q'd) - c(q'd)]

Notice that IIc and IIs are the same, except that one contains

q~

and the other contains

q;. There is a unique solution to the firm's problem, so that

q~

= q;.

To show that q~ > q'd, consider IIc(q'd). If ~drr*
> 0, then we know that centralized
qd
profits can be increased by setting

q~

> q'd. First, we note that

IIc(q'd) = nR(q'd) - c(nq'd) > n[R(q'd) - c(q'd)] = IId

This implies that IIc( q~) > II d( q'd) , since the centralized firm has the option to ship q'd,
and chooses not to do so.
Also ,

IIc
= n[R' (q'd) - c'(nq'd)] > n[R' (q'd) - c'(q'd)] = 0
q'd

dd
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So that centralized profits increase as quantities rise from q'd. This implies
Case 2: Errors never occur (c

= 0). Profit maximization implies that

q~

~dr:
qi d

> q'd.

= 0 and

that moving in any direction from qid will cause TId to fall, or remain unchanged. Thus,
if we can show that there is some movement from qid that causes TIc to rise, we can
conclude that the centralized firm makes at least as much profit as the decentralized
firm. If this movement involves increasing qid' we can further say that

L qic > L qid'

Noting that c = 0, centralized profit evaluated at the optimal decentralized quantity is
given by:

TIc(qid) Ic:=o= LR(qid) -

C

(Lqid)

i

Thus , we see that

The centralized firm has the option of shipping decentralized quantities to each outlet ,
but profit rises when it ships more than this amount. Thus, centralized profits must be
at least as high as decentralized profits.

Q.E.D.

Signing ~ : Simple calculation shows that:

':f: > «)0 ~ L (I(A;) [;}]) > «)0
t

Since f()..i) is increasing and concave in ).., 0 = f(E)") > Ef()..).

cov(q, A) 2: 0 and

-£j- is increasing in qi, cov (/(Ai), -£j-) 2: o.

Since
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Thus, we obtain the following string of inequalities:

The first inequality is due to the positive covariance of f()\ i) and

o and

Ii:,.

Because E f(>..) :S

-it :S 0, the last term in the string is non-negative.
t

The case of ;:,~~)) decreasing in q has a nice interpretation in terms of the firm's
"prudence." If we posit a function g( ,) that is increasing and convex, and such that ~
agrees in sign with

2: (9('i) [;'/((~})]), we could show that when ;:,~~~

is decreasing in q,

total quantity produced falls as mistakes become more likely. According to Eeckhoudt ,
Golier , and Schneider (1995) (citing another paper) , a consumer is prudent when the
third derivative of her utility function is positive. Using this definition, we may call our
firm prudent when R~" (q) > O. It is easily shown that ;'}(~)) decreasing in q goes along
with R"' (q) > O. A prudent centralized firm may reduce the total quantity it ships in
the face of increasing errors. 20

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2: The standardized firm's profit function is given by equa-

tion 3. When it makes only errors, the centralized firm's profit function is TIc 1£=1 =

2:i R( q7c) - c(2: q7J·

The first-order condition in this case is given by

c
dTI
*) d * = R' (qtC

qic

This equation holds for all qi, so that q7c

TIc 1£=1 =

2:i R(q~) - c(2: q~) =

nR(q~)

-

'(Q) = 0

C

= qjc =

q~.

Thus, centralized profit is

c(nq~). If we replace q~ with the optimal

standardized quantity (q;), we can turn TIc 1£=1 into TIs. Combine this with uniqueness
of the solution to conclude that q;

=

q~,

which leads directly to the desired result.

Q.E.D.

20 Unfortunately,

except in these special cases , signing

d;qi~i

does not appear to lead to a general

condition regarding over- or under-production by the firm as a whole.
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Proof of Lemma 3: Equation 1 gives the centralized firm's profit function. If we

differentiate it with respect to c, we obtain

The envelope theorem allows us to ignore the second-order effect on profits which come
d *

through d~c .
Define
-

Fi(X) = cR(x) + (1 -

c)~(x)

1
n

- -c(Q)

and
-

-

1
n

F(x) = R(x) - -c(Q)

Notice that Fi(X) - F(x)

= (1 -

c)[~(x)

- R(x)], so that

~
~[Fi(X) - F(x)] = (1 - c) ~
~[~(x) - R(x)] = (1 - c) [- dIIc]
de
~c

q~

Thus , if we can show that L:[Fi(X) - F(x)] 2: 0, the proof is complete.
Consider

L: F( qic)' We know that there is a number q such that L: F( qiJ

=

is maximized by the vector ific' L:[Fi(qic) - F(q)] is maximized by the same vector.
Furthermore, L:[Fi(q) - F(q)] = O. Since the centralized firm has the option to ship q
to each outlet, forqic

=I q, L:[Fi(qic)-F(q)] 2: O. But L:[Fi(qic)-F(q)]

= (I-c)

[-~],

which proves the result.
Q.E.D.
An alternative proof for Lemma 3 is as follows: 21 Suppose two versions of our firm
exist· the first makes mistakes with probability
c2

<
21 I

Cl.

Cl

< 1 and the second with probability

Then the second "firm" can, by strategically making a few additional errors,

thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this more direct proof.
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imitate the first. If this second firm ships quantity qie(cl) , it earns profits

If we subtract the profits earned by "firm" one (which makes mistakes with probability
Cl),

we have

because Cl

- C2

> 0 and L:i [~( qi) - R( qd 1 > 0 as long some outlets i and j are different

from each other. Thus , the more likely mistakes are, the less profitable is the firm.

Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4: From lemma 3, we know that TIe Ic<l2: TIe Ic=l. From proposition 2, we have TIe Ic=l = TIs. Putting the two together proves the result.

Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5: This proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that ~
depends on the sizes of the total marginal cost and average marginal revenue , and may
be positive or negative. Next, we show that there is a quantity which sets ~ = O.
Finally, we conclude that for outlets with optimal quantities smaller (larger) than this,

~ > «) 0, and that this quantity is between the smallest and largest outlets' optimal
quantities.

Step 1:

dJi

c

:b R' (qtJ - c' (Q). The first-order conditions for the centralized firm are

given by

(4)
These equations hold for qie = qte' Thus, we can totally differentiate 4, and rearrange
to get

(5)
The e" (Q)dQ term drops out of this calculation, since by assumption dQ = O. The

24

denominator is negative, so that

(6)

Rearrange the firm 's first-order condition (equation 4) to get

This allows us to rewrite equation 6 as , ~ :b R'(qic) - l~E [c'(Q) - cR'(qiJ]. Rearranging gives ~

> «)0 ¢:} R' (qic) - c'(Q) > «)0.

Step 2: There exists a

if. such

allows us to find a number

that R' (if)

if. such

= c' (Q), and

¥l = O.

Continui ty of R' (.)

that

(7)

If R~ (qiJ > R' (qic) then R' (if) > R' (qic) so that if. < qic satisfies equation 1. If R~ (qic) <
1

R' (qiJ then equation 1 is satisfied by if. > qic' Since (1 - c )R~ (qic)
1

-,

we have R (if)

= c'(Q).

Thus,

+ cRt (qic) = c' (Q),

d~

J: = 0 (see step 1).

Note that the quantity

if. is

not necessarily the arithmetical average quantity

shipped to outlets (71 = ~). The revenue function is concave, so that the revenue
earned from the average quantity (L:i ~ (71)) must be greater than the average revenue

(L:i R(qi))' Thus , if. satisfying R' (if)
Step 3:

if.

E

=

c'(Q) will not equal q in general.

[qic,min qic,max] , and for qic < (> )if., ~ > «)0. To see that if.
1

E

[qic,min qic,max]' order the qi so that ql > q2 > ... qn. Concavity of the revenue function
1

implies that for all i ,

25

Sum over all i and divide by n to get 0 2: R' (qic) - c' (Q)

R' (if) 2: R' (qic)

=}

=}

c' (Q) 2: R' (qic)

=}

q ::; qic

Similarly, for all i, we know

Sum over all i, and divide by n to get 0 ::; R' (q~J - c' (Q)

=}

c' (Q) ::; R' (q~c)

=}

q 2: q~c

_II

Using

steps

R' (qiJ > «)R' (if)

¢:}

1

and

2,

and

noting

that

R (qic)

<

0

implies

qic < (> )q, we construct the following chain:

Q.E.D.
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Abstract
Single-plant firms choose quantity/quality levels to maximize profits. Multiplant firms face this decision and must also choose how many decision makers to
have. This paper presents two case studies and a model of a multi-plant firm in
which overhead costs are lower with one decision-maker (centralization), but the
mass of information and the need for timely decisions make occasional mixups unavoidable. Multiple decision makers (decentralization) solves the mixup problem.
Standardization - treating different outlets similarly in response to costly mixups
- appears in the case studies, and is demonstrated as a result in the model.

1

Introduction

All firms receive information and use it to make decisions. Multi-plant firms receive
information at scattered locations and must choose how this knowledge will flow and
how decisions will be made. The firm might have a single decision maker , which I
call centralization, or it might allow each location to make decisions based on any
information available to t hem , a situation I call decentralization.
*Thanks are due to my dissertation supervisor, R. Preston McAfee, and to Maxwell Stinchcombe
and David Scoones for their helpful suggestions and continuously open office doors. This paper has
also benefited from comments received at the 1996 Lonestars Conference, and at seminars given at
The University of Texas at Austin , Southern Methodist University and Texas A&M University. Any
remaining errors are mine.

This paper considers issues affecting the choice between one and several decision makers, first through a simple model of a multi-plant firm and then through two
case studies which illustrate many of the model's conclusions. The model assumes, and
the case studies show that a single decision maker often has trouble handling all information available from widely scattered locations. Mixups (shipping the wrong bundle
to an outlet) are an unavoidable consequence of having a single "boss".1 When the firm
has more than one decision maker, mixups are avoided, but overhead costs are larger.
One of the model's key results, which is confirmed by the case studies, is that the
centralized firm often "standardizes" as a way to simplify the problem it faces. That
is , it ships similar (and less-than-optimal) bundles to all outlets, even though resizing
or reforming bundles could increase the profitability of anyone outlet.
There is a large literature in which delay (and its minimization) is the driving
force behind organizational form. Radner (1993), Van Zandt and Radner (1995), Van
Zandt (1995), Van Zandt (1998) use organizational form to minimize the time required
to process a batch of information. This work is extended by Bolton and Dewatripont

(1994), who include both processing and communication delay. The firm minimizes delay when agents specialize in processing particular types of information. Specialization
also occurs in the model of Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991), in which the firm may
dictate which bits of information managers attend to. The firm's problem then is to
coordinate the different bits of information its managers hold. Communication delay
is at issue in Marschak and Reichelstein (1998), who relate organizational structure to
the size of communication costs and message complexity. The issue of time to transmit
information is also considered in Govindarajan (1986), who note that communication
delay in a rapidly changing environment or in a firm where coordination is crucial may
favor centralization. A key assumption of these models is that no worker below the top
1 Centralization will be used interchangeably with "single decision maker" throughout this paper.
Decentralization tells us that every plant is empowered to make decisions for itself.

